Allies turned foes: How Taliban and Pakistan fell out

A week after Pakistan bombed Kabul and clashes broke out between the Taliban and Pakistan military, the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, is still not calm. After a brief pause, border clashes again erupted, claiming 15 Afghan civilian lives and leaving many injured. Both nations reported inflicting damage on the other's military assets, including tanks, weapons and posts.

How Pakistan birthed the Taliban
The roots of the Taliban-Pakistan relationship trace back to the late Cold War period, when Pakistan, backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia, played a central role in arming and training mujahideen fighters to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was during this time that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence ( ISI) deepened its involvement in Afghan affairs, fostering militant networks that would later evolve into the Taliban.

When the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s from the madrassas of Pakistan’s border regions, it was Pakistan that offered political recognition, military support and a logistical base. Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a strategic asset to secure "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. It was an old military doctrine aimed at countering Indian influence. For over two decades, the Taliban provided Pakistan with leverage in regional politics, including during the U.S. war on terror, when Islamabad played a complex double game, supporting U.S. operations publicly while harbouring Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar and later Haibatullah Akhundzada.

How things went wrong after the U.S. withdrawal
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a critical turning point. Pakistan had long lobbied for the Taliban’s inclusion in Afghan politics, hoping a friendly regime in Kabul would bring stability to the border and give it more depth to take on India. But what followed instead was against Paksitan's expectations.

Once in power, the Taliban began asserting independence. Rather than act as Pakistan’s proxy, the Taliban leadership displayed a nationalist streak, refusing to crack down on groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a deadly militant group responsible for attacks on Pakistani soil. Islamabad expected the Taliban to curtail TTP activity, but the Taliban, due to ideological and tribal affinities, offered sanctuary to TTP fighters instead. This refusal to act against TTP became the first major fault line. But a larger issue was the Taliban refusing to act as Pakistan's proxy any longer and wishing to emerge as an independent, sovereign power, something Pakistan was not used to.

The resurgence of the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces has been a strategic nightmare for Pakistan. Attacks on military convoys and police stations have intensified since the Taliban's return to power. Islamabad’s frustration with Kabul has grown, and the recent deadly cross-border clashes have brought tensions to the surface in the most violent way in years.

In the past, Pakistani officials often defended the Taliban internationally. Now, for the first time, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is openly questioning the legitimacy of the Taliban government. It is a stark reversal from its previous role as the chief advocate of the Taliban. The security relationship has reached a breaking point. What was once a covert, unacknowledged alliance has turned into overt hostility.

The Durand Line, the disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, has always been a sore point. The Taliban, like previous Afghan governments, refuses to recognise it as an international boundary. Pakistan has been fencing the border for years in an attempt to control cross-border movement, much to Kabul’s ire.

Now, with the Pakistani military launching cross-border bombings, the Taliban have responded with lethal attacks on Pakistan, capturing many of its border posts. The fencing of the border, the deportation of lakhs of Afghan refugees and now military strikes reflect Pakistan's stance changing from engagement to confrontation.

Regional implications
This worsening relationship has far-reaching implications for regional stability. It opens space for other regional actors like India, China, Iran and Russia to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Pakistan’s expense. More importantly, the ongoing border conflict threatens to plunge two volatile nations into prolonged low-intensity conflict, destabilising an already fragile region. The Taliban's growing diplomatic ties with other countries, particularly with India, are further eroding Pakistan's strategic leverage.

Pakistan once believed it could control the Taliban through patronage and ideological affinity. But like other great powers before it, Islamabad has learned that proxies can evolve into unpredictable actors with their own agendas. The Taliban’s desire for sovereignty, its ethnic priorities and its refusal to fight Pakistan’s enemies have created an irreparable rift.

For the Taliban, Pakistan is no longer the indispensable partner it once was. For Pakistan, the Taliban is no longer the pliant proxy it nurtured. While the Taliban can never have the upper hand in conflict with Pakistan, they can become a constant nuisance. Pakistan may have to divert some of its military and intelligence resources away from its border with India. Clashes with the Taliban come when Pakistan is grappling with intensifying unrest in Balochistan and PoK. All these factors can weigh down Pakistan's military and intelligence capabilities. The Taliban-Pakistan clashes also don't bode well for Trump's plan to extract minerals from Pakistan. Constant unrest will make that plan unviable or difficult to implement.